G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14586
DP14586 Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects
Ron Kaniel; Dmitry Orlov
发表日期2020-04-09
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents’ ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. An agent’s track record gradually reduces the intermediary’s information advantage. We show that in response, the intermediary starts churning well-performing agents she knows to be less skilled. Despite leading to an accelerated reduction in information advantage, such selectivity boosts profits as retained agents accept below-reservation wages to build a reputation faster. Agents prefer starting their careers working for an intermediary, as benefits from building reputation faster more than offsets expropriation costs. We derive implications of this mechanism for pay-for- performance sensitivity, bonuses, and turnover. Our analysis applies to professions where talent is essential, and performance is publicly observable, such as asset management, legal partnerships, and accounting firms.
主题Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics
关键词Dynamic signaling Dynamic adverse selection Compensation Career concerns Real options
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14586
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543493
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ron Kaniel,Dmitry Orlov. DP14586 Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects. 2020.
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