| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP14586
|
| DP14586 Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects |
| Ron Kaniel; Dmitry Orlov
|
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-09
|
| 出版年 | 2020
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents’ ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. An agent’s track record gradually reduces the intermediary’s information advantage. We show that in response, the intermediary starts churning well-performing agents she knows to be less skilled. Despite leading to an accelerated reduction in information advantage, such selectivity boosts profits as retained agents accept below-reservation wages to build a reputation faster. Agents prefer starting their careers working for an intermediary, as benefits from building reputation faster more than offsets expropriation costs. We derive implications of this mechanism for pay-for- performance sensitivity, bonuses, and turnover. Our analysis applies to professions where talent is essential, and performance is publicly observable, such as asset management, legal partnerships, and accounting firms. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Industrial Organization
; Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Dynamic signaling
Dynamic adverse selection
Compensation
Career concerns
Real options
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14586
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543493
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ron Kaniel,Dmitry Orlov. DP14586 Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects. 2020.
|
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