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来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14595
DP14595 Optimization incentives in dilemma games with strategic complementarity
Jan Potters; Sigrid Suetens
发表日期2020-04-10
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We examine whether optimization incentives --- incentives to best-respond --- have an effect on behavior in finitely repeated two-player dilemma games with strategic complements. We run an experiment in which we increase optimization incentives in two different ways compared to a baseline treatment. In the first treatment, the increase in optimization incentives is created by an increase in payoffs on the best-response curve, while its slope remains unchanged. In the second treatment, the increase in optimization incentives takes the form of an increase in the slope of the best-response curve, while best-response payoffs remain unchanged. We find that the impact of optimization incentives is overshadowed by the effect of the slope of the best-response curve. Although an increase in optimization incentives leads subjects to best-respond more frequently when the best-response curve is relatively flat, it leads to more cooperative behavior if it is accompanied by an increase in the slope of the best-response function.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Optimization incentives Strategic complementarity Repeated game Cooperation Experiments
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14595
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543502
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714		 Jan Potters,Sigrid Suetens. DP14595 Optimization incentives in dilemma games with strategic complementarity. 2020.
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