| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14597 |
| DP14597 Lobbying for Globalization | |
| Michael Blanga-Gubbay; Paola Conconi; Mathieu Parenti | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-11 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the role of firms in the political economy of free trade agreements (FTAs). Using detailed information from lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, we show that lobbying on FTAs is dominated by large firms engaged in international trade, which are in favor of these agreements. We develop a model of endogenous lobbying on FTAs by heterogeneous firms, which can explain why only pro-FTA "superstar" firms select into lobbying. The model also delivers predictions on the intensive margin of lobbying. In line with these predictions, we find that larger firms spend more supporting a trade agreement, and individual firms spend more supporting agreements that generate larger gains -- i.e. larger improvements in their access to foreign consumers and suppliers and smaller increases in domestic competition -- and that are more likely to be opposed by politicians. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14597-2 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543504 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Blanga-Gubbay,Paola Conconi,Mathieu Parenti. DP14597 Lobbying for Globalization. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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