| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP14610
|
| DP14610 Two-Stage Matching Contests |
| Aner Sela
|
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-14
|
| 出版年 | 2020
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study two-sided matching contests with two sets of agents, each of which includes n heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. In the first stage, the agents simultaneously send their costly efforts and then the order of choosing a partner from the other set is determined according to the Tullock contest success function. In the second stage, each agent chooses a partner from the other set, and an agent has a positive revenue if there is a matching in which he chooses a partner from the other set and this partner also chooses him. We analyze the agents' equilibrium efforts in the first stage as well as their choices of partners in the second stage, and demonstrate that if the agents' values, which are functions of the types of the agents who are matched, are either multiplicative or additive, their efforts are not necessarily monotonically increasing in their types. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Matching
Tullock contest
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14610
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543520
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Aner Sela. DP14610 Two-Stage Matching Contests. 2020.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
