| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14615 |
| DP14615 Robust Pricing with Refunds | |
| Toomas Hinnosaar; Keiichi Kawai | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-15 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer, however, can conclusively learn the fit only after purchasing and trying out the product. We show that the seller can use a simple mechanism to best take advantage of the buyer's post-purchase learning to maximize his guaranteed-profit. We show that this mechanism combines a generous refund, which performs well when the buyer is relatively informed, with non-refundable random discounts, which work well when the buyer is relatively uninformed. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Optimal pricing Robustness Return policies Refunds Monopoly Information design Mechanism design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14615 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543524 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Toomas Hinnosaar,Keiichi Kawai. DP14615 Robust Pricing with Refunds. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
