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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP14619 |
DP14619 Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability | |
Felipe Carozzi; Davide Cipullo; Luca Repetto | |
发表日期 | 2020-04-16 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. We show that each additional party with representation in Parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 4 percentage points. Governments with more resources at their disposal for bargaining are less likely to be replaced. When they are, new government leaders are younger and better educated, suggesting instability may induce positive selection. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. Our findings indicate that the rising fragmentation in parliaments worldwide may have a substantial impact on stability and political selection. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Government stability Fragmentation No-confidence votes Bargaining Alignment effect |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14619 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543529 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Felipe Carozzi,Davide Cipullo,Luca Repetto. DP14619 Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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