G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14672
DP14672 A Political Model of Trust
Konstantin Sonin; Ran Eilat; Marina Agranov
发表日期2020-04-28
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We analyze a model of political competition, in which the uninformed median voter chooses whether to follow or ignore the advice of the elite that forms endogenously to aggregate information. In equilibrium, information transmission is possible only if voters trust the elite's endorsement of potentially biased candidates. When inequality is high, the elite's informational advantage is minimized by the voters' distrust. When inequality reaches a certain threshold, the trust, and thus the information transmission, breaks down completely. Finally, the elite size and thus the extent of information aggregation depends on the amount of trust they can maintain.
主题Public Economics
关键词Trust Inequality Political economy Cheap talk Information club
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14672-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543587
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Konstantin Sonin,Ran Eilat,Marina Agranov. DP14672 A Political Model of Trust. 2020.
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