| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14672 |
| DP14672 A Political Model of Trust | |
| Konstantin Sonin; Ran Eilat; Marina Agranov | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a simple model of political competition, in which the uninformed median voter chooses whether to follow or ignore the advice of the informed elites. In equilibrium, information transmission is possible only if voters trust the elites' endorsement of potentially biased candidates. When inequality is high, the elites' informational advantage is minimized by the voters' distrust. When inequality reaches a certain threshold, the trust, and thus the information transmission, breaks down completely. Finally, the size of the elite forming in equilibrium depends on the amount of trust they are able to maintain. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Trust Inequality Political economy Cheap talk Information club |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14672 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543588 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konstantin Sonin,Ran Eilat,Marina Agranov. DP14672 A Political Model of Trust. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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