| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14678 |
| DP14678 Do corporate disclosures constrain strategic analyst behavior? | |
| Yen-Cheng Chang; Alexander Ljungqvist; Kevin Tseng | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-29 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that U.S. analysts alter their forecasting behavior in response to a randomly assigned shock that exogenously varies the timeliness and cost of accessing companies’ mandatory disclosures in the cross-section of investors: analysts reduce the number of stocks they cover, issue less optimistic and more accurate forecasts that are less bold, and collectively reduce forecast dispersion. Our investigation of possible channels favors the explanation that analysts reduce the strategic component of their behavior: the changes are more pronounced among analysts with stronger incentives to strategically skew their forecasts, such as affiliated analysts and those catering to retail investors. We conclude that mandatory disclosure is a substitute for information production by analysts, whose behavior is constrained by investors’ ability to verify their forecasts using corporate filings. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14678 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543595 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yen-Cheng Chang,Alexander Ljungqvist,Kevin Tseng. DP14678 Do corporate disclosures constrain strategic analyst behavior?. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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