| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14682 |
| DP14682 Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips | |
| Facundo Piguillem; Alessandro Riboni | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-04-29 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Most fiscal rules can be overridden by consensus. We show that this does not make them ineffectual. Since fiscal rules determine the outside option in case of disagreement, the opposition uses them as ``bargaining chips" to obtain spending concessions. We show that under some conditions this political bargain mitigates the debt accumulation problem. We analyze various rules and find that when political polarization is high, harsh fiscal rules (e.g., government shutdown) maximize the opposition's bargaining power and leads to lower debt accumulation. When polarization is low, less strict fiscal limits (e.g, balanced-budget rule) are preferable. Moreover, we find that the optimal fiscal rules could arise in equilibrium by negotiation. Finally, by insuring against power fluctuations, negotiable rules yield higher welfare than strict ones. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal rules Government debt Legislative bargaining Political polarization Government shutdown= |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14682 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543598 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Facundo Piguillem,Alessandro Riboni. DP14682 Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
