| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14700 |
| DP14700 Preferences, Confusion and Competition | |
| Andreas Hefti; Shuo Liu; Armin Schmutzler | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-03 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Do firms seek to make the market transparent, or do they confuse consumers in their product perceptions? We show that the answer to this question depends decisively on preference heterogeneity. Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, confusion is not necessarily an equilibrium in markets with differentiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are relatively rare, firms strive to fully educate consumers. By contrast, if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion becomes part of the equilibrium strategies. The adverse welfare consequences of confusion can be more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also choose a dominated option, or inefficiently refrain from buying. Qualitatively similar insights obtain for political contests, in which candidates compete for voters with heterogeneous preferences. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Obfuscation Consumer confusion Differentiated products Price competition Polarized/indecisive preferences Political competition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14700 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543617 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andreas Hefti,Shuo Liu,Armin Schmutzler. DP14700 Preferences, Confusion and Competition. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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