| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14709 |
| DP14709 Kill Zone | |
| Luigi Zingales; Sai Krishna Kamepalli; Raghuram Rajan | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-04 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study why acquisitions of entrant firms by an incumbent can deter innovation and entry in the digital platform industry, where there are strong network externalities and some customers face switching costs. A high probability of an acquisition induces some potential early adopters to wait for the entrant's product to be integrated into the incumbent's product instead of switching to the entrant. Because of this, the incumbent is able to acquire the entrant for a lower price. Even if the incumbent platform does not undertake any traditional anti-competitive action, the reduction in prospective payoffs to entrants creates a “kill zone” in the space of startups, as described by venture capitalists, where entry is hard to finance. The drop-off in venture capital investment in startups in sectors where Facebook and Google make major acquisitions suggests this is more than just a theoretical possibility. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Digital platforms Acquisitions Kill zone |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14709-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543626 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luigi Zingales,Sai Krishna Kamepalli,Raghuram Rajan. DP14709 Kill Zone. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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