| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14709 |
| DP14709 Kill Zone | |
| Luigi Zingales; Sai Krishna Kamepalli; Raghuram Rajan | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-04 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study why high-priced acquisitions of entrants by an incumbent do not necessarily stimulate more innovation and entry in an industry (like that of digital platforms) where customers face switching costs and enjoy network externalities. The prospect of an acquisition by the incumbent platform undermines early adoption by customers, reducing prospective payoffs to new entrants. This creates a “kill zone” in the space of startups, as described by venture capitalists, where new ventures are not worth funding. Evidence from changes in investment in startups by venture capitalists after major acquisitions by Facebook and Google suggests this is more than a mere theoretical possibility. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Digital platforms Acquisitions Kill zone |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14709 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543627 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luigi Zingales,Sai Krishna Kamepalli,Raghuram Rajan. DP14709 Kill Zone. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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