| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14712 |
| DP14712 The Quran and the Sword: The Strategic Game Between Autocratic Power, the Military and the Clerics | |
| Emmanuelle Auriol; Jean-Philippe Platteau; Thierry Verdier | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-05 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially make a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants to co-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Empirically, the dominant regime in contemporary Muslim countries is the regime of double co-option. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains only where the autocrat's intrinsic legitimacy and the loyalty of his army are strong while the organizational strength of religious movements is rather low. Radical institutional reforms can then be implemented. Rent economies where ultra-conservative clerics are powerful enough to block any institutional reform that they dislike represent another polar case. More frequently, the autocrat resorts to a double-edged tactic: pleasing the official clerics by slowing the pace of reforms, and ensuring the loyalty of the military to be able to put down an opposition instigated by rebel clerics. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Autocracy Army Instrumentalization of religion Islam Reforms |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14712 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543630 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emmanuelle Auriol,Jean-Philippe Platteau,Thierry Verdier. DP14712 The Quran and the Sword: The Strategic Game Between Autocratic Power, the Military and the Clerics. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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