| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14718 |
| DP14718 Selling Constraints | |
| José-Luis Moraga-González; Makoto Watanabe | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Each firm has one unit to sell of a differentiated product and each consumer has demand for one unit. Consumers queue at the firms, inspect their products if they get the turn, and choose whether to buy or not. We study how selling constraints, which refer to the possible inability of firms to attend to all the buyers who may queue at their premises, affect the equilibrium price and social welfare. Efficient pricing typically involves a positive markup. A higher price, on the one hand, increases the value of trade (because only trades generating positive surplus are consummated) and, on the other hand, reduces the quantity of trade (because fewer buyers can afford paying a higher price). We show that equilibrium markups are inefficiently high except in the limiting situation of no selling constraints, in which case the equilibrium markup is efficient. Thus, selling constraints constitute a source of market power. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Price posting Ordered search Capacity- and selling-constrained firms |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14718 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543637 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | José-Luis Moraga-González,Makoto Watanabe. DP14718 Selling Constraints. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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