| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14722 |
| DP14722 Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings | |
| Daniel Garrett; Francesc Dilmé | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study relational contracting with an agent who has consumption-smoothing preferences as well as the ability to save to defer consumption (or to borrow). Our focus is the comparison of principal-optimal relational contracts in two settings. The first where the agent’s consumption and savings decisions are private, and the second where these decisions are publicly observed. In the first case, the agent smooths his consumption over time, the agent’s effort and payments eventually decrease with time, and the balances on his savings account eventually increase. In the second, the agent consumes earlier than he would like, consumption and the balance on savings fall over time, and effort and payments to the agent increase. Our results suggest a possible explanation for low savings rates in certain industries where compensation often comes in the form of discretionary payments. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Relational contracts Private savings |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14722 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543643 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Garrett,Francesc Dilmé. DP14722 Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Daniel Garrett]的文章 |
| [Francesc Dilmé]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Daniel Garrett]的文章 |
| [Francesc Dilmé]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Daniel Garrett]的文章 |
| [Francesc Dilmé]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
