G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14724
DP14724 Bank Resolution Regimes and Systemic Risk
Dayen Radev; Isabel Schnabel
发表日期2020-05-06
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We assess the ability of bank resolution frameworks to deal with systemic banking fragility. Using a novel and detailed database on bank resolution regimes in 22 member countries of the Financial Stability Board, we show that systemic risk, as measured by △CoVaR, increases more for banks in countries with more comprehensive bank resolution frameworks after negative system-wide shocks, such as Lehman Brothers' default, while it decreases more after positive system-wide shocks, such as Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes'' speech. These results suggest that more comprehensive bank resolution may exacerbate the effect of system-wide shocks and should not be solely relied on in cases of systemic distress.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Bank resolution regimes Bail-in Systemic risk
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14724
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543645
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dayen Radev,Isabel Schnabel. DP14724 Bank Resolution Regimes and Systemic Risk. 2020.
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