| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14725 |
| DP14725 Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting | |
| Daniel Garrett | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-07 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimally structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does know that the principal knows them. We provide, in particular, tight bounds on the principal's expected benefit from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the agent's expected rents. We thus show how economically relevant predictions can be made robustly given ignorance of a key primitive. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Mechanism design Robustness Procurement |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14725 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543646 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Garrett. DP14725 Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting. 2020. |
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