全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP14731 The Hammer and the Dance: Equilibrium and Optimal Policy during a Pandemic Crisis

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP14731
	DP14731 The Hammer and the Dance: Equilibrium and Optimal Policy during a Pandemic Crisis
	Fabrice Collard; Christian HELLWIG; Tiziana Assenza; Sumudu Kankanamge; Martial Dupaigne; Nicolas Werquin; Patrick Feve
发表日期	2020-05-08
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	We develop a comprehensive framework for analyzing optimal economic policy during a pandemic crisis in a dynamic economic model that trades off pandemic-induced mortality costs against the adverse economic impact of policy interventions. We use the comparison between the planner problem and the dynamic decentralized equilibrium to highlight the margins of policy intervention and describe optimal policy actions. As our main conclusion, we provide a strong and novel economic justification for the current approach to dealing with the pandemic, which is different from the existing health policy rationales. This justification is based on a simple economic concept, the shadow price of infection risks, which succinctly captures the static and dynamic trade-offs and externalities between economic prosperity and mortality risk as the pandemic unfolds.
主题	Macroeconomics and Growth ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
关键词	Pandemic crisis Optimal policy
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp14731-0
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543654
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Fabrice Collard,Christian HELLWIG,Tiziana Assenza,et al. DP14731 The Hammer and the Dance: Equilibrium and Optimal Policy during a Pandemic Crisis. 2020.