| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14735 |
| DP14735 Advertisement-Financed Credit Ratings | |
| Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer; Christian Siemering | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-09 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper investigates the incentives of a credit rating agency (CRA) to generate accurate ratings under an advertisement-based business model. We study a two-period endogenous reputation model in which the CRA can choose to provide private effort in evaluating financial products in each period. We show that the advertisement-based business model may provide sufficient incentives to improve the precision of signals when the CRA has an intermediate reputation. Furthermore, we identify conditions under which truthful reporting is incentive compatible. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Credit rating agencies Rating precision Information acquisition Advertisement Reputation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14735 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543658 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer,Christian Siemering. DP14735 Advertisement-Financed Credit Ratings. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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