| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14745 |
| DP14745 Optimal Checks and Balances Under Policy Uncertainty | |
| Gabriele Gratton; Massimo Morelli | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-11 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Political checks and balances are certainly among the most debated desiderata in the construction of democratic systems and their evaluation. This paper suggests a conceptual framework that could be useful to inform this debate. We propose a model where the pros and cons of a strengthening of checks and balances are respectively the reduction of type-I errors and the increase of potential type-II errors in policy decision-making. Checks and balances are less desirable for intermediate levels of competence of the political class and more desirable when the bureaucracy is slower or when the political system involves frequent turnover, and in policy areas where the welfare effects of a reform are harder to evaluate and effective accountability is low. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Checks and balances Information Uncertain policy quality Effective accountability |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14745 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543669 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gabriele Gratton,Massimo Morelli. DP14745 Optimal Checks and Balances Under Policy Uncertainty. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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