G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14754
DP14754 On-site inspecting zombie lending
Diana Bonfim; Geraldo Cerqueiro; Hans Degryse; Steven Ongena
发表日期2020-05-13
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要In spite of growing regulatory pressure in most developed economies, “zombie lending” remains a widespread practice by banks. In this paper we exploit a series of large-scale on-site inspections made on the credit portfolios of several Portuguese banks to investigate how these inspections affect banks’ future lending decisions. We find that an inspected bank becomes 20% less likely to refinance zombie firms, immediately spurring their default. However, banks change their lending decisions only in the inspected sectors. Overall, banks seemingly reduce zombie lending because the incentives to hold these loans disappear once they are forced to recognize losses.
主题Financial Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14754
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543678
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Diana Bonfim,Geraldo Cerqueiro,Hans Degryse,et al. DP14754 On-site inspecting zombie lending. 2020.
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