G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16384
DP16384 Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment
Christian Moser; Pierre Yared
发表日期2020-05-13
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要This paper studies lockdown policy in a dynamic economy without government commitment. Lockdown imposes a cap on labor supply, which improves health prospects at the cost of economic output and consumption. A government would like to commit to the extent of future lockdowns in order to guarantee an economic outlook that supports efficient levels of investment into intermediate inputs. However, such a commitment is not credible, since investments are sunk at the time when the government chooses a lockdown. As a result, lockdown under lack of commitment deviates from the optimal policy. Rules that limit a government's lockdown discretion can improve social welfare, even in the presence of noncontractible information. Quantitatively, lack of commitment causes lockdown to be significantly more severe than is socially optimal. The output and consumption loss due to lack of commitment is greater for higher intermediate input shares, higher discount rates, higher values of life, higher disease transmission rates at and outside of work, and longer vaccine arrival times.
主题Labour Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations ; Public Economics
关键词Coronavirus Covid-19 Sars-cov-2 Sird model Optimal policy Pandemic restrictions Lockdown Non-pharmaceutical interventions Rules Commitment and flexibility
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16384-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543680
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Christian Moser,Pierre Yared. DP16384 Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment. 2020.
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