| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP16384
|
| DP16384 Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment |
| Christian Moser; Pierre Yared
|
| 发表日期 | 2020-05-13
|
| 出版年 | 2020
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper studies lockdown policy in a dynamic economy without government commitment. Lockdown imposes a cap on labor supply, which improves health prospects at the cost of economic output and consumption. A government would like to commit to the extent of future lockdowns in order to guarantee an economic outlook that supports efficient levels of investment into intermediate inputs. However, such a commitment is not credible, since investments are sunk at the time when the government chooses a lockdown. As a result, lockdown under lack of commitment deviates from the optimal policy. Rules that limit a government's lockdown discretion can improve social welfare, even in the presence of noncontractible information. Quantitatively, lack of commitment causes lockdown to be significantly more severe than is socially optimal. The output and consumption loss due to lack of commitment is greater for higher intermediate input shares, higher discount rates, higher values of life, higher disease transmission rates at and outside of work, and longer vaccine arrival times. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics
; Macroeconomics and Growth
; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
; Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Coronavirus
Covid-19
Sars-cov-2
Sird model
Optimal policy
Pandemic restrictions
Lockdown
Non-pharmaceutical interventions
Rules
Commitment and flexibility
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16384-0
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543680
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Christian Moser,Pierre Yared. DP16384 Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment. 2020.
|
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