全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP14807 Institutions, opportunism and prosocial behavior: Some experimental evidence

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP14807
	DP14807 Institutions, opportunism and prosocial behavior: Some experimental evidence
	Antonio Cabrales; Irma Clots Figueras; Roberto Hernán-González; Praveen Kujal
发表日期	2020-05-25
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) choice of institutions. Whether voted or purchased, we find that there is demand for institutions in low trustworthiness groups, while high trustworthiness groups always demand lower levels of institutions. Lower levels of institutions are demanded when those who can benefit from opportunistic behavior, i.e. low trustworthiness individuals, can also vote for them. Importantly, the presence of insurance crowds out civic spirit even when subjects can choose the no insurance option: trustworthiness when formal institutions are available is lower than in their absence.
主题	Development Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics ; Public Economics
关键词	Institutions Trust Trustworthiness Voting Insurance
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp14807
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543739
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Antonio Cabrales,Irma Clots Figueras,Roberto Hernán-González,et al. DP14807 Institutions, opportunism and prosocial behavior: Some experimental evidence. 2020.