| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14839 |
| DP14839 The Value of Luck in the Labor Market for CEOs | |
| Mario Daniele Amore; Sebastian Schwenen | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-02 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is well-known that luck increases the compensation of CEOs at their current firm. In this paper, we explore how luck affects CEOs’ outside options in the labor market, and the performance of firms that hire lucky CEOs. Our results show that luck at their current firm makes CEOs move to a new firm and be appointed as both CEO and chairman. Lucky CEOs tend to match with firms subject to low analyst coverage and operating in less competitive industries. Moreover, lucky CEOs are able to obtain a higher pay at the new firm (both in absolute terms and compared to new industry peers). Finally, difference-in-differences results show that hiring lucky CEOs hurts firm performance, mostly due to a surge in operating costs and a poorer usage of corporate assets. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Luck Ceo mobility Compensation Firm performance Corporate governance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14839 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543773 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mario Daniele Amore,Sebastian Schwenen. DP14839 The Value of Luck in the Labor Market for CEOs. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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