| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14857 |
| DP14857 The Optimal Length of Political Terms | |
| Hans Gersbach; Matthew O. Jackson; Oriol Tejada | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-09 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the optimal length of political terms (equivalently, the optimal frequency with which elections should be held) when the candidates of two polarized parties compete for office and the median voter shifts over time. Office-holders determine policy and experience persistent random shocks to their valence. Policy changes are costly for citizens and politicians. Optimal term-length balances the frequency of costly policy changes when parties change office with the incumbent's average valence during tenure. We find that optimal term-length increases with party polarization, with the degree to which the median voter cares about valence, and with the frequency and the size of swings in the electorate. In contrast, optimal term-length decreases when candidates for office undergo less scrutiny or when parties care more about future outcomes. Finally, with small swings in the electorate and large polarization, optimal term-length increases if checks and balances increase. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Elections Term-length Costs of change Polarization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14857 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543796 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Matthew O. Jackson,Oriol Tejada. DP14857 The Optimal Length of Political Terms. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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