| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14858 |
| DP14858 Electoral Competition with Costly Policy Changes: A Dynamic Perspective | |
| Hans Gersbach; Matthew O. Jackson; Philippe Muller; Oriol Tejada | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-09 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze dynamic electoral competition policy changes. The costs of changing a policy increase with the extent of the shift and generate an incumbency advantage. We characterize the dynamics of Markov equilibria in terms of history and party polarization, and analyze how policies are influenced by the amplitude and convexity of costs of change, as well as by the degree of party and voter farsightedness. Regardless of the initial policy, party choices converge in the long run to a stochastic alternation between two (regions of) policies, with transitions occurring when office-holders suffer a shock to their capacity or valence. Although costs of change have a moderating effect on policies, full convergence to the median voter position does not take place. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Democracy Dynamic elections Political polarization Costs of change Markov perfect equilibrium |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14858 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543797 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Matthew O. Jackson,Philippe Muller,et al. DP14858 Electoral Competition with Costly Policy Changes: A Dynamic Perspective. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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