G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14867
DP14867 Bailing out the Kids: New Evidence on Informal Insurance from one Billion Bank Transfers
Asger Lau Andersen; Niels Johannesen; Adam Sheridan
发表日期2020-06-10
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We combine transaction-level data from the largest retail bank in Denmark and individual-level data from government registers to study informal insurance within social networks. Accounting for transfers in cash (money transfers) and in kind (cohabitation), we estimate that family and friends jointly replace around 7 cents of the marginal dollar lost within the bottom income decile, but much less at higher income levels. We document that informal insurance covers other adverse events than income losses: expenditure shocks, family ruptures and financial distress. Parents appear to be the key providers of informal insurance with a small amount of insurance coming from siblings and virtually none from grandparents and friends. Replacement rates vary monotonically with parent economic resources.
主题Public Economics
关键词Informal insurance altruism private transfers Risk sharing
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14867
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543805
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Asger Lau Andersen,Niels Johannesen,Adam Sheridan. DP14867 Bailing out the Kids: New Evidence on Informal Insurance from one Billion Bank Transfers. 2020.
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