G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14896
DP14896 Immigration, Occupational Choice and Electoral Rules Theory and Evidence on Dual Ballot Openness
Matteo Gamalerio; Massimo Morelli; Margherita Negri
发表日期2020-06-15
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Do institutions affect the level of openness of immigration policies? We study theoretically and empirically how different electoral systems affect the reception of refugees, comparing Single Round Plurality with Dual Ballot systems. We focus on mayoral elections at the municipality level. Our model predicts that municipalities that elect the mayor with a Dual Ballot system receive more refugee- related fiscal transfers from the central government and are more likely to host refugees, compared to municipalities that use a Single Round Plurality system. Using data from Italian municipalities and regression discontinuity design, we provide empirical evidence that confirms the predictions of the theoretical model.
主题Public Economics
关键词Electoral rules Immigration Occupational choice Sprar
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14896
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543837
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Matteo Gamalerio,Massimo Morelli,Margherita Negri. DP14896 Immigration, Occupational Choice and Electoral Rules Theory and Evidence on Dual Ballot Openness. 2020.
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