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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP14896 |
DP14896 Immigration, Occupational Choice and Electoral Rules Theory and Evidence on Dual Ballot Openness | |
Matteo Gamalerio; Massimo Morelli; Margherita Negri | |
发表日期 | 2020-06-15 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Do institutions affect the level of openness of immigration policies? We study theoretically and empirically how different electoral systems affect the reception of refugees, comparing Single Round Plurality with Dual Ballot systems. We focus on mayoral elections at the municipality level. Our model predicts that municipalities that elect the mayor with a Dual Ballot system receive more refugee- related fiscal transfers from the central government and are more likely to host refugees, compared to municipalities that use a Single Round Plurality system. Using data from Italian municipalities and regression discontinuity design, we provide empirical evidence that confirms the predictions of the theoretical model. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Electoral rules Immigration Occupational choice Sprar |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14896 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543837 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matteo Gamalerio,Massimo Morelli,Margherita Negri. DP14896 Immigration, Occupational Choice and Electoral Rules Theory and Evidence on Dual Ballot Openness. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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