| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14913 |
| DP14913 Do Bank Insiders Impede Equity Issuances? | |
| Martin Götz; Luc Laeven; Ross Levine | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-21 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We evaluate the role of insider ownership in shaping banks’ equity issuances in response to the global financial crisis. We construct a unique dataset on the ownership structure of U.S. banks and their equity issuances and discover that greater insider ownership leads to less equity issuances. Several tests are consistent with the view that bank insiders are reluctant to reduce their private benefits of control by diluting their ownership through equity issuances. Given the connection between bank equity and lending, the results stress that ownership structure can shape the resilience of banks—and hence the entire economy—to aggregate shocks. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Ownership structure Equity issuances Banking Financial crisis Regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14913 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543854 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Götz,Luc Laeven,Ross Levine. DP14913 Do Bank Insiders Impede Equity Issuances?. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
