| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14920 |
| DP14920 Bargaining over a divisible good in the market for lemons | |
| Dino Gerardi; Lucas Maestri; Ignacio Monzon | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study bargaining with divisibility and interdependent values. A buyer and a seller trade a durable good divided into finitely many units. The seller is privately informed about the good's quality, which can be either high or low. Gains from trade are positive and decreasing in the number of units traded by the parties. In every period, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer that specifies a price and a number of units. Divisibility introduces a new channel of competition between the buyer's present and future selves. The buyer's temptation to split the purchases of the high-quality good is detrimental to him. As bargaining frictions vanish and the good becomes arbitrarily divisible, the high-quality good is traded smoothly over time and the buyer's payoff shrinks to zero. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bargaining Gradual sale Coase conjecture Divisible objects Interdependent valuations Market for lemons |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14920 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543862 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dino Gerardi,Lucas Maestri,Ignacio Monzon. DP14920 Bargaining over a divisible good in the market for lemons. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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