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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP14976 |
DP14976 Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions | |
Elizabeth Baldwin; Paul Goldberg; Paul Klemperer; Edwin Lock | |
发表日期 | 2020-06-30 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions: it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction’s bidding language to truthfully express their strong-substitutes preferences over an arbitrary number of goods, each of which is available in multiple discrete units. Our use of the bidding language, and the information it provides, contrasts with existing algorithms that rely on access to a valuation or demand oracle. We compute market-clearing prices using algorithms that apply existing submodular minimisation methods. Allocating the supply among the bidders at these prices then requires solving a novel constrained matching problem. Our algorithm iteratively simplifies the allocation problem, perturbing bids and prices in a way that resolves tie-breaking choices created by bids that can be accepted on more than one good. We provide practical running time bounds on both price-finding and allocation, and illustrate experimentally that our allocation mechanism is practical. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Bidding language Product-mix auction Competitive equilibrium Walrasian equilibrium Convex optimisation Strong substitutes Submodular minimisation |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14976 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543920 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Elizabeth Baldwin,Paul Goldberg,Paul Klemperer,et al. DP14976 Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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