| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14978 |
| DP14978 Stackelberg Independence | |
| Toomas Hinnosaar | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg quantity leadership model with linear demand. I show that under the standard assumptions, leaders' actions are informative about market conditions and independent of leaders' beliefs about the arrivals of followers. However, this Stackelberg independence property relies on all standard assumptions being satisfied. It fails to hold whenever the demand function is non-linear, marginal cost is not constant, goods are differentiated, firms are non-identical, or there are any externalities. I show that small deviations from the linear demand assumption may make the leaders' choices completely uninformative. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Sequential games Oligopolies Stackelberg leadership model |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14978 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543923 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Toomas Hinnosaar. DP14978 Stackelberg Independence. 2020. |
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