| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14993 |
| DP14993 A Game-Theoretical Model of the Landscape Theory | |
| Michel Le Breton; Alexander Shapoval; Shlomo Weber | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we examine a game-theoretical generalization of the landscape theory introduced by Axelrod and Bennett (1993). In their two-bloc setting each player ranks the blocs on the basis of the sum of her individual evaluations of members of the group. We extend the Axelrod-Bennett setting by allowing an arbitrary number of blocs and expanding the set of possible deviations to include multi-country gradual deviations. We show that a Pareto optimal landscape equilibrium which is immune to profitable gradual deviations always exists. We also indicate that while a landscape equilibrium is a stronger concept than Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, it is weaker than strong Nash equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Landscape theory Landscape equilibrium Blocs Gradual deviation Potential functions Hedonic games |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14993 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543941 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michel Le Breton,Alexander Shapoval,Shlomo Weber. DP14993 A Game-Theoretical Model of the Landscape Theory. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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