全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP15030 The Dark Side of Transparency: Mission Variety and Industry Equilibrium in Decentralized Public Good Provision

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP15030
	DP15030 The Dark Side of Transparency: Mission Variety and Industry Equilibrium in Decentralized Public Good Provision
	Gani Aldashev; Esteban Jaimovich; Thierry Verdier
发表日期	2020-07-10
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	We study the implications of transparency policies on the decentralized public good provision, by focusing on how the moral hazard problem inside non-profits interacts with the competitive structure of the sector under alternative informational regimes. More transparency on the use of funds has an ambiguous effect on the total public good provision and the welfare of donors. On the one hand, more transparency encourages non-profit managers to devote more resources to curbing rent-seeking inside organizations. On the other hand, it tilts the playing field against non-profits managers who face higher cost of monitoring, inducing them to abandon their missions. From the donors' perspective, there are two corresponding opposing effects: transparency is good because of the reduction in rent-seeking in the non-profits active in the market, but it can backfire because of a lower diversity of non-profits. Donors' welfare is lower under transparency (than under no information on the use of funds) for intermediate levels of asymmetry in the cost of monitoring.
主题	Development Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词	Non-profit organizations Charitable giving altruism transparency
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp15030
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543980
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Gani Aldashev,Esteban Jaimovich,Thierry Verdier. DP15030 The Dark Side of Transparency: Mission Variety and Industry Equilibrium in Decentralized Public Good Provision. 2020.