| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP15046
|
| DP15046 Risk Sharing within the Firm: A Primer |
| Marco Pagano
|
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-16
|
| 出版年 | 2020
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Labor income risk is key to the welfare of most people. This risk is mainly insured “within the firm” and by public institutions, rather than by financial markets. This paper starts by asking why such insurance is provided within the firm, and what determines its boundaries. It identifies four main constraining factors: availability of a public safety net, moral hazard on the employees’ side, moral hazard on the firms’ side, and workers’ wage bargaining power. These factors explain three empirical regularities: (i) family firms provide more employment insurance than nonfamily firms; (ii) the former pay lower real wages, and (iii) firms provide less employment insurance where public unemployment benefits are more generous. The paper also explores the connection between risk sharing and firms’ capital structure: greater leverage calls for high wages to compensate employees for greater job risk; nevertheless, firms may want to lever up strategically in order to offset the bargaining power of labor unions. Hence, the distributional conflict between shareholders and workers may limit risk sharing within the firm. By contrast, bondholders and workers are not necessarily in conflict, as both are harmed by firms’ risk-taking. In principle, firms may also insure employees against uncertainty about their own talent, but their capacity to do so is constrained by workers’ inability to commit to their employer: in the presence of labor market competition, high-talent employees will leave unless paid in line with their high productivity, making uncertainty about talent uninsurable. The paper concludes by showing that risk sharing within firms has declined steadily in the last three decades, and by discussing the financial, competitive, technological and institutional developments that may have conjured this outcome. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Risk sharing
Insurance
Unemployment
Safety net
Implicit contracts
Family firms
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15046
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543997
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Marco Pagano. DP15046 Risk Sharing within the Firm: A Primer. 2020.
|
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