| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15075 |
| DP15075 "Soft" Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment | |
| Daniel Fershtman; Alessandro Pavan | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-21 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study search, evaluation, and selection of candidates of unknown quality for a position. We examine the effects of “soft” affirmative action policies increasing the relative percentage of minority candidates in the candidate pool. We show that, while meant to encourage minority hiring, such policies may backfire if the evaluation of minority candidates is noisier than that of non-minorities. This may occur even if minorities are at least as qualified and as valuable as non-minorities. The results provide a possible explanation for why certain soft affirmative action policies have proved counterproductive, even in the absence of (implicit) bias. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Affirmative action Recruitment Sequential evaluations Learning from endogenous consideration sets |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15075 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544031 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Fershtman,Alessandro Pavan. DP15075 "Soft" Affirmative Action and Minority Recruitment. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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