| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15079 |
| DP15079 The Hidden Costs of Strategic Opacity | |
| Ana Babus; maryam farboodi | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-21 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We explore a model in which banks strategically hold interconnected and opaque portfolios, despite increasing the likelihood they are subject to financial crises. In our framework, banks choose their degree of exposure to other banks to influence how investors can use their information. In equilibrium banks choose portfolios which are neither fully opaque, nor fully transparent. However, their portfolios are excessively interconnected to obfuscate investor information. Banks can create a degree of opacity that decreases welfare, and makes bank crises more likely. Our model is suggestive about the implications of asset securitization, as well as government bailouts. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Opacity Banking crises Interdependent portfolios |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15079 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544035 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ana Babus,maryam farboodi. DP15079 The Hidden Costs of Strategic Opacity. 2020. |
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