| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15081 |
| DP15081 The economics of deferral and clawback requirements | |
| Florian Hoffmann; Roman Inderst; Marcus Opp | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-22 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the effects of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements restricting (incentive) compensation of material risk-takers in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements have a robustly positive effect on equilibrium risk-management effort only if the bank manager's outside option is sufficiently high, else, their effectiveness depends on the dynamics of information arrival. Stringent deferral requirements unambiguously backfire. We characterize when regulators should not impose any deferral regulation at all, when it can achieve second-best welfare, when additional clawback requirements are of value, and highlight the interaction with capital regulation. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Compensation regulation Clawbacks Bonus deferral Short-termism Moral hazard Principal-agent models with externalities |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15081 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544037 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Florian Hoffmann,Roman Inderst,Marcus Opp. DP15081 The economics of deferral and clawback requirements. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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