| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15082 |
| DP15082 Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets | |
| Thierry Magnac; Yinghua He | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-23 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A matching market often requires recruiting agents, or ``programs,'' to costly screen ``applicants,'' and congestion increases with the number of applicants to be screened. We investigate the role of application costs: Higher costs reduce congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to certain programs; however, they may harm match quality. In a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we implement variants of the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with different application costs. Our experimental and structural estimates show that a (low) application cost effectively reduces congestion without harming match quality. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Gale-shapley deferred acceptance mechanism Costly preference formation Screening Stable matching Congestion Matching market design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15082 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544038 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Magnac,Yinghua He. DP15082 Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets. 2020. |
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