G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15082
DP15082 Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets
Thierry Magnac; Yinghua He
发表日期2020-07-23
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要A matching market often requires recruiting agents, or ``programs,'' to costly screen ``applicants,'' and congestion increases with the number of applicants to be screened. We investigate the role of application costs: Higher costs reduce congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to certain programs; however, they may harm match quality. In a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we implement variants of the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with different application costs. Our experimental and structural estimates show that a (low) application cost effectively reduces congestion without harming match quality.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Gale-shapley deferred acceptance mechanism Costly preference formation Screening Stable matching Congestion Matching market design
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15082
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544038
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Thierry Magnac,Yinghua He. DP15082 Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets. 2020.
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