| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15104 |
| DP15104 Information, Market Power and Price Volatility | |
| Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris; Tibor Heumann | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-27 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. Regardless of the number of agents and the correlation of payo¤ shocks, market power may be arbitrarily close to zero (the competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no trade). By contrast, price volatility is always lower than the variance of the aggregate shock across all information structures. Alternative trading mechanisms lead to very distinct bounds as a comparison with Cournot competition establishes. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Demand function competition Supply function competition Price impact market power Incomplete information Price volatility Cournot competition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15104 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544060 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Bergemann,Stephen Morris,Tibor Heumann. DP15104 Information, Market Power and Price Volatility. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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