| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15137 |
| DP15137 Pricing group membership | |
| Antonio Cabrales; Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a model where agents differ in their `types' which determines their voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under centralized and centralized choice. We show that there exists a top-down sorting equilibrium i.e. an equilibrium where there exists a set of prices which leads to groups that can be ordered by level of types, with the first k types in the group with the highest price and so on. This exists both under decentralized and centralized choosing. We also analyze the model with endogenous group size and examine under what conditions is top-down sorting socially ecient. We illustrate when integration (i.e. mixing types so that each group's average type if the same) is socially better than top-down sorting. Finally, we show that top down sorting is efficient even when groups compete among themselves. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics and Growth ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Top-down sorting Group-formation Public good Segregation Integration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15137 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544099 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Antonio Cabrales,Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay. DP15137 Pricing group membership. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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