全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP15138 Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the D.R. Congo

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP15138
	DP15138 Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the D.R. Congo
	Pablo Balán; Augustin Bergeron; Gabriel Tourek; Jonathan Weigel
发表日期	2020-08-06
出版年	2020
语种	英语
摘要	Historical states with low capacity often delegated tax collection to local elites, despite the risk of mismanagement. Could this strategy raise revenues without undermining government legitimacy in fragile states today? We provide evidence from a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a Congolese city — spanning 45,162 properties — to tax collection by state agents or by city chiefs. Chief collection raised property tax compliance by 3.3 percentage points, increasing revenues by 43%. Although chiefs collected more bribes, we find no evidence of mismanagement or backlash on other margins. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which state agents consulted with chiefs before collection suggest that chief collectors achieved higher compliance by using local information to more efficiently target households with high payment propensities, rather than by being more effective at persuading households to pay conditional on having visited them.
主题	Development Economics
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp15138
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544100
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Pablo Balán,Augustin Bergeron,Gabriel Tourek,et al. DP15138 Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the D.R. Congo. 2020.