G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15141
DP15141 Power, Scrutiny, and Congressmen's Favoritism for Friends' Firm
Quoc-Anh Do; Yen-Teik Lee; Bang Dang Nguyen; Kieu-Trang Nguyen
发表日期2020-08-06
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Does more political power always lead to more favoritism? The usual affirmative answer overlooks scrutiny's role in shaping the pattern of favoritism over the ladder of power. When attaining higher-powered positions under even stricter scrutiny, politicians may reduce quid-pro-quo favors towards connected firms to preserve their career prospect. Around close Congress elections, we find RDD-based evidence of this adverse effect that a politician's win reduces his former classmates' firms stock value by 2.8%. As predicted, this effect varies by cross-state scrutiny, politicians' power, firms' size and governance, and connection strength. It diminishes as a politician's career concern fades over time.
主题Financial Economics ; Labour Economics ; Public Economics
关键词Favoritism Power Scrutiny Political connection Congressmen Close election Rdd
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15141-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544104
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Quoc-Anh Do,Yen-Teik Lee,Bang Dang Nguyen,et al. DP15141 Power, Scrutiny, and Congressmen's Favoritism for Friends' Firm. 2020.
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