| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15141 |
| DP15141 Power, Scrutiny, and Congressmen's Favoritism for Friends' Firm | |
| Quoc-Anh Do; Yen-Teik Lee; Bang Dang Nguyen; Kieu-Trang Nguyen | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Does more political power always lead to more favoritism? The usual affirmative answer overlooks scrutiny's role in shaping the pattern of favoritism over the ladder of power. When attaining higher-powered positions under even stricter scrutiny, politicians may reduce quid-pro-quo favors towards connected firms to preserve their career prospect. Around close Congress elections, we find RDD-based evidence of this adverse effect that a politician's win reduces his former classmates' firms stock value by 2.8%. As predicted, this effect varies by cross-state scrutiny, politicians' power, firms' size and governance, and connection strength. It diminishes as a politician's career concern fades over time. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Favoritism Power Scrutiny Political connection Congressmen Close election Rdd |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15141-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544104 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Quoc-Anh Do,Yen-Teik Lee,Bang Dang Nguyen,et al. DP15141 Power, Scrutiny, and Congressmen's Favoritism for Friends' Firm. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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