G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15024
DP15024 Board dynamics over the startup life cycle
Michael Ewens; Nadya Malenko
发表日期2020-08-08
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Venture capital (VC) backed firms face neither the regulatory requirements nor a major separation of ownership and control of their public peers. These differences suggest that independent directors could play a unique role on private firm boards. This paper explores the dynamics of VC-backed startup boards using novel data on director entry, exit, and characteristics. We document new facts about board composition, allocation of control, and dynamics, and examine the roles of independent directors. At formation, a typical board is entrepreneur-controlled. Independent directors join the median board after the second financing, when board control becomes shared, with independent directors holding the tie-breaking vote between entrepreneurs and VCs. At later stages, control switches to VCs and independent director characteristics change. These patterns are consistent with independent directors playing both a mediating and advising role over the startup life cycle, and thus representing another potential source of value-add to startup performance.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Venture capital Corporate governance Board of directors Independent directors Allocation of control Mediation role
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15024-7
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544110
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Michael Ewens,Nadya Malenko. DP15024 Board dynamics over the startup life cycle. 2020.
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