| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15024 |
| DP15024 Board dynamics over the startup life cycle | |
| Michael Ewens; Nadya Malenko | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-08 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Venture capital (VC) backed firms face neither the governance requirements nor a major separation of ownership and control of their public peers. These differences suggest that independent directors could play a unique role on private firm boards. This paper explores the dynamics of VC-backed startup boards using new data on board member entry, exit, and individual director characteristics. We document several new facts about board size, the allocation of control, and composition dynamics. At formation, a typical board has four members and is entrepreneur-controlled. Independent directors are found on the median board after the second financing event, when control over the board becomes shared, with independent directors holding the tie-breaking vote. These patterns are consistent with independent directors playing both a mediating and advising role over the startup life cycle, and thus representing another potential source of value-add to entrepreneurial firm performance. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Venture capital Corporate governance Board of directors Independent directors Allocation of control Mediation role |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15024-4 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544111 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Ewens,Nadya Malenko. DP15024 Board dynamics over the startup life cycle. 2020. |
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