| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15165 |
| DP15165 When does board diversity benefit shareholders? Strategic deadlock as a commitment to monitor | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist; Konrad Raff | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-13 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We ask when and how a diverse board can benefit shareholders. Board diversity may be value-increasing even if some directors have agendas that are not perfectly aligned with shareholders’ interests. Diversity commits the board to a high information standard because directors with opposing agendas are deadlocked unless they have persuasive information in support of the optimal course of action. Since deadlock is costly, diversity strengthens directors’ incentives to gather information ex ante, which raises expected firm value. Diversity is more likely desirable if the firm's information environment is poor and if directors' opposing agendas are accompanied by sufficiently strong incentives for value maximization. However, if directors cannot credibly communicate their information, a homogeneous board dominates a diverse board. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Boards of directors Diversity Monitoring Deadlock |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15165 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544133 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist,Konrad Raff. DP15165 When does board diversity benefit shareholders? Strategic deadlock as a commitment to monitor. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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