G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15165
DP15165 When does board diversity benefit shareholders? Strategic deadlock as a commitment to monitor
Alexander Ljungqvist; Konrad Raff
发表日期2020-08-13
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We ask when and how a diverse board can benefit shareholders. Board diversity may be value-increasing even if some directors have agendas that are not perfectly aligned with shareholders’ interests. Diversity commits the board to a high information standard because directors with opposing agendas are deadlocked unless they have persuasive information in support of the optimal course of action. Since deadlock is costly, diversity strengthens directors’ incentives to gather information ex ante, which raises expected firm value. Diversity is more likely desirable if the firm's information environment is poor and if directors' opposing agendas are accompanied by sufficiently strong incentives for value maximization. However, if directors cannot credibly communicate their information, a homogeneous board dominates a diverse board.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Boards of directors Diversity Monitoring Deadlock
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15165
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544133
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alexander Ljungqvist,Konrad Raff. DP15165 When does board diversity benefit shareholders? Strategic deadlock as a commitment to monitor. 2020.
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