| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15201 |
| DP15201 Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? | |
| Alessandra Casella; Antonin Macé | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-25 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, a practice indeed believed to be common. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling -- the exchange of votes for votes, considering both explicit vote exchanges and implicit vote trades engineered by bundling issues in a single bill. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We cover competitive markets, strategic market games, decentralized bargaining, and more centralized mechanisms, such as quadratic voting, where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions -- to trade votes with oneself only -- such as storable votes or a modified form of quadratic voting. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Logrolling Voting Vote markets Storable votes Quadratic voting Bundling |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15201 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544172 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Antonin Macé. DP15201 Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
