| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15203 |
| DP15203 Information Revelation and Privacy Protection | |
| Rossella Argenziano; Alessandro Bonatti | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-25 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a microfoundation for consumers' privacy preferences and examine how it shapes the outcome of regulation. A single consumer interacts sequentially with two heterogeneous firms: the first firm collects data on consumer behavior, which the second firm uses to set a quality level and a price. Thus, the consumer manipulates her behavior to influence the future terms of trade. In equilibrium, manipulation is beneficial to the consumer when the recipient firm is sufficiently similar to the collecting firm (as measured by the relative salience of quality and price of their two products). We then evaluate the impact of privacy regulation, including mandatory transparency, explicit consent requirements, and limits to discriminatory offers. We show that transparency has an ambiguous effect on consumer welfare and that consent requirements are unambiguously beneficial to consumers but that limits to discrimination are harmful to consumers in equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Consumer privacy Consumer consent Personal information Data linkages Data rights Price discrimination Signaling Ratchet effect |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15203 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544174 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rossella Argenziano,Alessandro Bonatti. DP15203 Information Revelation and Privacy Protection. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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