G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15203
DP15203 Information Revelation and Privacy Protection
Rossella Argenziano; Alessandro Bonatti
发表日期2020-08-25
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要We propose a microfoundation for consumers' privacy preferences and examine how it shapes the outcome of regulation. A single consumer interacts sequentially with two heterogeneous firms: the first firm collects data on consumer behavior, which the second firm uses to set a quality level and a price. Thus, the consumer manipulates her behavior to influence the future terms of trade. In equilibrium, manipulation is beneficial to the consumer when the recipient firm is sufficiently similar to the collecting firm (as measured by the relative salience of quality and price of their two products). We then evaluate the impact of privacy regulation, including mandatory transparency, explicit consent requirements, and limits to discriminatory offers. We show that transparency has an ambiguous effect on consumer welfare and that consent requirements are unambiguously beneficial to consumers but that limits to discrimination are harmful to consumers in equilibrium.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Consumer privacy Consumer consent Personal information Data linkages Data rights Price discrimination Signaling Ratchet effect
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15203
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544174
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rossella Argenziano,Alessandro Bonatti. DP15203 Information Revelation and Privacy Protection. 2020.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Rossella Argenziano]的文章
[Alessandro Bonatti]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Rossella Argenziano]的文章
[Alessandro Bonatti]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Rossella Argenziano]的文章
[Alessandro Bonatti]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。