G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15213
DP15213 Economic Shocks and Populism: The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences
Fausto Panunzi; Nicola Pavoni; Guido Tabellini
发表日期2020-08-28
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要This paper studies electoral competition over redistributive taxes between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent. As in prospect theory, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are intrinsically attracted by the more risky candidate. We show that, after a large adverse economic shock, the equilibrium can display policy divergence: the more risky candidate proposes lower taxes and is supported by a coalition of very rich and very disappointed voters, while the safe candidate proposes higher taxes. This can explain why new populist parties are often supported by economically dissatisfied voters and yet they run on economic policy platforms of low redistribution. We show that survey data on the German SOEP are consistent with our theoretical predictions on voters’ behavior.
主题Public Economics
关键词Populism Prospect theory Behavioral political economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15213-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544185
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Fausto Panunzi,Nicola Pavoni,Guido Tabellini. DP15213 Economic Shocks and Populism: The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences. 2020.
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