| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15213 |
| DP15213 Economic Shocks and Populism: The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences | |
| Fausto Panunzi; Nicola Pavoni; Guido Tabellini | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-28 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies electoral competition over redistributive taxes between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent. As in prospect theory, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are intrinsically attracted by the more risky candidate. We show that, after a large adverse economic shock, the equilibrium can display policy divergence: the more risky candidate proposes lower taxes and is supported by a coalition of very rich and very disappointed voters, while the safe candidate proposes higher taxes. This can explain why new populist parties are often supported by economically dissatisfied voters and yet they run on economic policy platforms of low redistribution. We show that survey data on the German SOEP are consistent with our theoretical predictions on voters’ behavior. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Populism Prospect theory Behavioral political economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15213-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544185 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fausto Panunzi,Nicola Pavoni,Guido Tabellini. DP15213 Economic Shocks and Populism: The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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